SWELL

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How SWELL protects your files

Every transfer is locked on your device, travels locked, and is opened only on the device it was sent to. Here is exactly how, what our relay can and can't see, and what we don't claim.

Algorithms

The CNSA 2.0 algorithm suite.

SWELL uses the algorithms in the NSA's Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0, including the two post-quantum standards NIST published in 2024.

AlgorithmStandardWhat SWELL uses it for
ML-KEM-1024FIPS 203Delivering each transfer's key. Every transfer gets a fresh random key, locked to the recipient's post-quantum public key, so only their device can unlock it.
ML-DSA-87FIPS 204Signing. The sender signs each transfer's description (its manifest), so the recipient knows who sent it and that nothing was swapped.
AES-256-GCMFIPS 197, SP 800-38DEncrypting the file itself, piece by piece. Each piece is authenticated, so a changed byte is caught.
SHA-384FIPS 180-4Fingerprints of files and pieces, and the Swell Spatial Signature. Keys are derived with HKDF-SHA-384 and checked with HMAC-SHA-384.

What this does and doesn't mean. SWELL uses the CNSA 2.0 algorithm suite. That describes the algorithms we chose. SWELL has not been certified, validated or approved under CNSA 2.0, FIPS 140 or any other program, and we don't claim compliance with them.

A transfer, step by step

From your device to theirs.

On your device

SWELL makes a new random key for this transfer and encrypts the file with AES-256-GCM. It locks that key to the recipient with ML-KEM-1024 and signs the transfer with your ML-DSA-87 key. The file name is sealed too.

On the way

The locked pieces go straight to the other device when you're both reachable on the same network, or through the relay. Either way, only locked data travels.

On their device

The recipient's app checks your signature and every piece's fingerprint, unlocks the key, and rebuilds the file. Then it sends back proof (Landfall), and your app marks it delivered.

Saving a file locally, without sending it, works too: you lock it with a passphrase or a 64-character key of your own.

The relay

What our relay can and can't see.

The relay is a drop box for locked pieces, run by WiredLogix on Cloudflare. It never has the keys. We'd rather tell you exactly what it does see than say "nothing".

It can't see

  • Your file's contents. It stores only encrypted pieces.
  • The keys. They're made and kept on the two devices.
  • Your file's name. It's sealed, and padded so its length doesn't give it away.
  • Who a transfer notice is from. Notices are sealed to the recipient's key.
  • Your SWELL address in plain form. Inboxes and online status are looked up by a one-way fingerprint of it.

It can see

  • That a transfer exists, under a random ID, and when pieces are uploaded and downloaded.
  • How big it is. Piece sizes reveal roughly how large the file is. SWELL doesn't pad files to hide their size.
  • Network addresses (IP addresses) of devices that connect to it. To set up a direct connection, it passes each side's network address to the other.
  • A notification token, if you turn on notifications on iPhone or Mac, so it can send a plain "New transfer" alert with no names in it.

Clears itself

Gone within a day

Relay storage deletes a transfer's pieces one day after they were last written. Senders can delete a transfer sooner.

Receipts

Up to 30 days

Delivery proofs are opaque codes that only the sender's app can check. The relay keeps them for up to 30 days.

Direct

Skips the relay when it can

On the same network, devices connect to each other directly and the file doesn't need to touch the relay.

The browser app

A web app that checks itself.

Web apps usually trust whatever the server sends today. SWELL's browser app doesn't.

  • Published file list. Each release comes with a list of every file and its SHA-384 fingerprint.
  • Checked on install. The installed app checks every file against that list and refuses one that doesn't match.
  • No silent updates. A new version waits until you choose to update.
  • Locked-down page. A strict content security policy lets the page talk only to the SWELL relay.

Tested

  • Rebuilding a release from source gave the same files, with the same fingerprints.
  • In an automated Chrome test: it installed with every file checked, worked offline, waited for the person before updating, refused a tampered file and never switched versions silently (7 of 7 checks, November 2026).

What we've tested

Results, with their conditions.

We state what was tested and how, not more.

Three implementations

Same answers, independently

The Apple apps, the Android core and the Windows core are written separately and checked against the same frozen test vectors, so a mistake in one shows up as a mismatch.

Windows

Byte-identical receives

The Windows core passed 29 of 29 tests. Received files of 100 MiB matched the originals byte for byte, on a Mac test harness and on a Windows 11 test machine, against our live relay (November 2026).

Reviews

Every crypto call, on record

Every place the code uses cryptography is listed with its purpose and status, with every finding from our repeated internal review rounds and how it was resolved.

Limits

What SWELL doesn't do.

Honest trade-offs

  • Traffic is visible as traffic. Someone watching the network can see that encrypted data is moving, when and roughly how much. SWELL protects what it is, not the fact that it moves.
  • Sizes aren't hidden. See above.
  • Your device is the boundary. If a device is compromised, files on it are too.

Per platform

  • Apple devices keep your identity key in the Keychain.
  • Windows (in development) protects it with Windows data protection for your user account. Other programs running as you could read it. Hardware-backed storage is planned.
  • The browser app is in private preview.

Found a security problem? Please tell us at support@wiredlogix.com with "SWELL security" in the subject. We read every report.